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In this article, we propose a thought experiment: what if copyright 
law could better incorporate social and cultural norms around 
content engagement and re-use? We draw on empirical research that 
explores the norms of different creative communities when they re-
use the work of others, and the norms of consumers around sharing. 
We outline how both creators and copyright users engage almost 
daily in small-scale infringement that does not substitute or disrupt 
copyright owners’ established markets, either because the uses are 
highly transformative, or personal and unremarkable. We suggest 
that copyright could better reflect these norms if both norms and 
moral rights were considered as part of a remedies assessment. We 
propose that in cases where work has been attributed and treated with 
integrity, and where the use does not directly cause economic harm 
to the copyright owner, courts should award only nominal damages 
and decline to order injunctive relief.  
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
It is uncontroversial to note that copyright law is not ideally suited to a digital 
environment.1 Despite the decrease in online copyright infringement over the past 
decade following the introduction of streaming media,2 there is still a foundational 
tension that resides around the enforcement of copyright online. Copyright, a legal 
framework that aims to establish a system of authorisation and control around the 
distribution of copies, has to work in concert with what Cory Doctorow has termed 
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1  See, eg, Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Prometheus Books, 2nd ed, 2006); Lawrence Lessig, Free 
Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity 
(Penguin Press, 2004).  
2  James Meese, ‘The Domestic Ecology of Australian Subscription Video on Demand Services’ (2017) 
164(1) Media International Australia 21, 24. See Ramon Lobato and James Meese, ‘Geoblocking and 
Global Video Culture’ (Reader No 18, Institute of Network Cultures, 2016). 
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‘the world’s most efficient copying machine’: the Internet.3 In addition to social 
changes brought about by the technical affordances of the Internet, there has been 
a dramatic change in the consumption practices of online audiences, who prefer to 
not just consume media but also to share it with friends, family members and 
colleagues, sometimes with and sometimes without the approval of the original 
copyright holder.4 As Tim Wu noted a decade ago, ‘casual copyright infringement 
is sometimes a near-unavoidable part of many people’s days’.5 This point was 
driven home in John Tehranian’s 2011 book, Infringement Nation, which 
eloquently demonstrated just how routine and largely unremarkable ordinary acts 
of copyright infringement are in the day-to-day lives of most people.6  
Both creators and copyright users alike engage almost daily in small-scale 
infringement that does not substitute or clearly disrupt copyright owners’ 
established markets, either because the uses are highly transformative (such as 
using a small sample of an existing song in creating a new musical work) or 
personal and unremarkable (such as reposting a copyrighted image on an 
individual social media profile). These uses tend to fall into the space that Tim Wu 
has termed ‘tolerated use’ – a grey zone in copyright enforcement, comprising of 
uses that are technically infringing but mostly tolerated by copyright owners, 
usually because enforcement is not worth the effort.7 Ordinary creative practice, 
and digital and social media uses of content, tend to involve a high degree of 
tolerated use. 
In this article, we propose a thought experiment: what if copyright law could 
better incorporate social and cultural norms around content engagement and re-
use? Generally speaking, the law treats copyright infringement under a property 
rule,8 presuming that any infringement causes irreparable harm that justifies 
granting injunctive relief.9 But this presumption is not necessarily true. Where 
copying substitutes for a paid licence, it is often easier to say that the rights-holder 
suffers a loss in revenue.10 In many cases, however, copying does not result in any 
identifiable loss of revenue, and direct harm may often be presumed where it does 
not exist.11 We propose, instead, that non-substitutive uses should be treated under 
a liability rule. In cases where work has been attributed and treated with integrity, 
and where the use does not directly cause economic harm to the copyright owner, 
 
3  Ben Murray, ‘Remixing Culture and Why the Art of the Mash-Up Matters’, TechCrunch (Online Article, 
22 March 2015) <https://techcrunch.com/2015/03/22/from-artistic-to-technological-mash-up/>.  
4  Corinne Tan, Regulating Content on Social Media: Copyright, Terms of Service and Technological 
Features (University College London Press, 2018) 5–6.  
5  Tim Wu, ‘Tolerated Use’ (2008) 31(4) Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 617, 618. 
6  John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You (Oxford University Press, 2011) ch 1. 
7  Wu (n 5) 618. 
8  See Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harvard Law Review 1089. 
9  See, eg, Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Copyright Agency Ltd (1996) 65 
FCR 399, 420 (Sackville J). 
10  See, eg, Eagle Rock Entertainment Ltd v Caisley (2005) 66 IPR 554, 556–7 [11] (Tamberlin J); 
Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Cougars Tavern Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 369, [18] 
(Raphael FM); Microsoft Corporation v Ezy Loans Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 54, 76–7 [88]–[92] (Stone J). 
11  See Nicolas Suzor, ‘Access, Progress and Fairness: Rethinking Exclusivity in Copyright’ (2013) 15(2) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 297. See especially at 339.  
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we suggest that courts should award only nominal damages and decline to order 
injunctive relief. This, we argue, would better align with cultural practice and the 
expectations of many creators and copyright users.12 
In making these claims, we draw on empirical research that explores the norms 
of different creative communities when they re-use the work of others, and the 
norms of consumers around sharing. Our qualitative data emerges from individual 
interviews with a range of creators, and group interviews with consumers, 
conducted across Australia in 2016 and 2017. The interviews revealed that 
Australian creators and consumers regularly re-used copyrighted works without 
seeking permission from copyright owners. It became apparent from these 
interviews that while technical infringements were often taking place, both 
creators and consumers felt justified in their actions because they had treated the 
copyrighted work with respect and had attributed (or attempted to attribute) the 
original author. In short, their practices aligned closely with Australia’s moral 
rights of integrity and attribution. Moreover, both consumers and creators 
presented a well-developed understanding of reasonableness as it relates to 
attribution, and creators also advanced a careful interpretation of what 
reasonableness looks like with reference to their understandings of authorial 
integrity.13 
Our qualitative data leads us to suggest that copyright could be more closely 
aligned with norms around content engagement and re-use if both these norms and 
moral rights were considered as part of the assessment of remedies for 
infringement. This would not require any dramatic reworking of the legal tests for 
infringement, or any legislative reform. Rather, it would serve as legal recognition 
that not every unauthorised copy or use of a work harms a copyright owner. The 
assessment of remedies is a space that affords sufficient flex to a court to consider 
the totality of the circumstances relating to the infringing acts, including whether 
the use was substitutive or non-substitutive, and whether the original creator has 
been treated with respect under Australia’s moral rights provisions. This is 
especially the case where remedies are discretionary, as they are for copyright 
infringement in Australia.14 Our argument proceeds on the basis that copyright is 
a legal framework that can and should aim to meaningfully regulate creative 
practice. Aligning the law with ordinary practices of creation, distribution and 
consumption will directly support the effectiveness and legitimacy of copyright 
 
12  We should note that in this article, we do not consider cultural harm, particularly harm that can flow to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons from misappropriation of Indigenous artistic works: see, eg, 
Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240; Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles Pty Ltd (1998) 86 FCR 
244. We focus primarily on economic harm flowing from the reproduction and use of non-Indigenous 
works. 
13  Our empirical research involved participants who were creators who engaged in some level of copyright 
re-use in their creative practice, and consumers on social media. We acknowledge that important 
stakeholders in copyright law are not represented in this study, especially many copyright owners, and 
that these stakeholders may not necessarily hold the view that certain infringements are harmless. 
14  Cf statutory damages in the United States. See Andrew Trotter, ‘Statutory Damages in Copyright’ (2010) 
21(4) Australian Intellectual Property Journal 219. 
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law,15 as well as give greater relevance to underused moral rights provisions. 
Ultimately, we propose that ordinary uses and circulation of copyrighted works 
should not be restricted where there is no direct commercial harm to the copyright 
owner and where the works have been treated with respect in accordance with 
moral rights.16  
This article is structured in seven parts. In Part II, we introduce the concept of 
copyright harm by discussing how remedies are determined for copyright 
infringement in Australia. We also consider Australia’s moral rights regime and 
posit that a failure to attribute an author or treat a work with integrity should be 
considered as part of an understanding of ‘copyright harm’. In Part III, we explain 
our methods for qualitative empirical research with Australian creators and 
copyright consumers. We present the findings from this research in Parts IV and 
V. Part IV covers copyright creators. We found that the creators we interviewed 
had a high tolerance for non-substitutive copyright infringement by other creators, 
provided that ‘respect’ was shown to them. Indeed, creators placed high 
importance on the giving and receiving of respect in re-use practices, which almost 
always required attribution as a minimum expectation. Part V discusses copyright 
consumers. We found that consumers also see attribution as an important ethical 
practice, though one with practical difficulties in the social media sharing 
environment. In Part VI, we draw together the findings from our creator and 
consumer studies to argue that copyright law can be better aligned to norms of 
creative practice through the assessment of remedies under law. We contend that 
norms of ‘respectful re-use’, which align closely with Australia’s moral rights 
provisions, should matter in the determination of remedies for copyright 
infringement. Where re-use does not cause the copyright owner economic harm 
and is respectful, then the appropriate remedy may be nominal damages and no 
injunctive relief. We conclude in Part VII by suggesting that there are two key 
benefits arising from our proposal: first, aligning law with practice can help to 
support the perceived legitimacy of copyright law; and second, our approach might 
help to improve the balance between individual creators and users as against 
powerful corporate rights-holders, especially in cases of copyright litigation. 
 
II   UNPACKING COPYRIGHT HARM 
A   Copyright Remedies 
In Australia, copyright is governed by the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
(‘Copyright Act’), which extends protection to literary, artistic, musical and 
dramatic works in Part III and sound recordings and cinematograph films in Part 
 
15  See Jessica Litman, ‘Real Copyright Reform’ (2010) 96(1) Iowa Law Review 1; Paula Dootson and 
Nicolas Suzor, ‘The Game of Clones and the Australia Tax: Divergent Views about Copyright Business 
Models and the Willingness of Australian Consumers to Infringe’ (2015) 38(1) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 206.  
16  As noted above, our arguments do not extend to cultural harms occasioned by unlicensed use and 
appropriation of creative works, particularly those experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
creators. 
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IV.17 Under the act, it is an infringement to reproduce a substantial part of a work 
or other subject matter without the permission of the copyright owner and without 
a legal exception.18 The exceptions to copyright infringement in Australia are 
limited, and will not generally apply to the kinds of creative or consumer uses that 
we discuss in this article.19  
Copyright infringements are actionable per se, meaning that they are 
actionable upon a showing of infringement even in the absence of harm.20 Under 
section 115(2) of the Copyright Act, in an action for infringement, a court may 
grant an injunction and either damages or an account of profits. While an 
injunction is a discretionary remedy, the default position in copyright cases tends 
to be that the court will grant injunctive relief, because courts adopt the 
presumption that copyright infringement causes irreparable harm to the copyright 
owner.21 Evidence of actual economic harm, while not necessary for a successful 
action, may be relevant to an assessment of monetary damages. 
The injunctive remedy available to courts in intellectual property cases has its 
origin in equity. An injunction is a discretionary remedy,22 and will not be awarded 
where damages are an adequate remedy.23 Cases have held that damages are 
inadequate where it is too difficult to calculate the damage likely to be suffered,24 
or to prevent a ‘multiplicity of actions’25 where the defendant threatens repeated or 
continuing infringements of a proprietary or possessory right.26 Injunctions have 
long been considered appropriate in intellectual property cases both because the 
economic harm occasioned by infringement – the kind of ‘taking’ where the owner 
 
17  Copyright Act ss 10, 31, 32, 85–92.  
18  Ibid ss 14, 36 (works), 101 (other subject matter). 
19  The fair dealing exceptions appear in ibid ss 40–3, 103A–104, 113E, 113F. They apply to uses for the 
purposes of: research or study; criticism or review; reporting the news; parody or satire; judicial 
proceedings; and access for or by a person with a disability. In general, creative use for the purpose of 
creating a new work (eg remix or reappropriation) or consumer uses involving creating memes or sharing 
on social media will not fall within the ambit of any of the fair dealing exceptions. They also do not come 
within the many other exceptions contained in the Copyright Act that apply to use by libraries and 
cultural institutions (eg ss 48–53, 113G–113M), or to format-shifting (ss 43C, 47J, 109A, 110AA) or 
time-shifting (s 111). 
20  Canterbury Park Racecourse Co Ltd v Hopkins (1932) 49 WN (NSW) 27, 29 (Long Innes J); Hawkes 
and Son (London) Ltd v Paramount Film Service Ltd [1934] 1 Ch 593, 608 (Romer LJ). 
21  See Ralph S Brown, ‘Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property Invasions: Themes and Variations’ (1992) 
55(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 45, 47; KJ Greene, ‘Motion Picture Copyright Infringement and 
the Presumption of Irreparable Harm: Toward a Reevaluation of the Standard for Preliminary Injunctive 
Relief’ (1999) 31(1) Rutgers Law Journal 173, 193–4; Pamela Samuelson and Krzysztof Bebenek, ‘Why 
Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction Cases’ (2010) 6(1) 
I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 67. 
22  Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380, 396 [32] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and 
Callinan JJ). See generally Tagget v Sexton (2009) 255 ALR 522. 
23  London and Blackwall Railway Co v Cross (1886) 31 Ch D 354, 369 (Lindley LJ); Irving v Emu & 
Prospect Gravel & Road Metal Co Ltd (1909) 26 WN (NSW) 137, 137 (Street J); DPP v Jones [1999] 2 
AC 240; Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148, 153 (Mason ACJ). 
24  Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209, 220–1 (Branson J). 
25  Angelides v James Stedman Henderson’s Sweets Ltd (1927) 40 CLR 43, 66 (Isaacs ACJ). 
26  See, eg, Beswicke v Alner (1925) 31 ALR 482; Goodson v Richardson (1874) LR 9 Ch App 221; Cooper 
v Crabtree (1882) 20 Ch D 589, 593 (Jessel MR).  
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is not deprived of their possessory interest – is notoriously difficult to calculate,27 
and because intellectual property is generally treated in accordance with property 
rules. As outlined in Calabresi and Melamed’s influential article, property rules 
protect entitlements through exclusive rights and the ability to enjoin unauthorised 
uses, whereas liability rules afford compensation to the owner after the entitlement 
has been used or destroyed (damages).28 Because the exclusivity granted under 
copyright is analogised to rights in physical property and protected under property 
rules, courts generally presume irreparable harm upon a showing of infringement 
that justifies the grant of an injunction to restrain the interference.29  
Both courts and scholars have questioned the application of property rules to 
intellectual property infringement cases.30 In the United States, the Supreme Court 
broke with established practice in Ebay Inc v Mercexchange LLC,31 by refusing to 
grant an injunction as a matter of course in a patent infringement case. The court 
held that there was no presumption of irreparable harm for patent infringement, 
and that a plaintiff must establish a need for injunctive relief under traditional 
equitable principles.32 Specifically, the Court held that a plaintiff must establish 
four factors:  
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that … monetary remedies … are 
inadequate …; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.33 
This reasoning has since been applied to copyright infringement cases.34 As 
some courts have moved away from presuming irreparable harm in intellectual 
property (‘IP’) cases, scholars have turned to the question of whether the concept 
of harm might play a more meaningful role in copyright actions.35 Christina 
Bohannan has noted how difficult it is for courts to ‘measure or weigh, in 
individual cases, the value of enforcing a copyright against the value of allowing 
the use’.36 She states that this is a modern quandary, arguing that, historically, the 
 
27  Trotter (n 14) 221 (discussing the literature concerning whether downloads or unlawful distribution of 
copyright material necessarily equates to lost sales). 
28  Calabresi and Melamed (n 8) 1092. 
29  See Andrew Spillane, ‘The Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of Irreparable Harm in Copyright 
Cases’ (2011) 15(1) Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 257; David McGowan, ‘Irreparable 
Harm’ (2010) 14(2) Lewis and Clark Law Review 577. 
30  See, eg, JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia (2012) 250 CLR 1. Gummow J discussed the 
treatment of trademarks as property: at 50; Mark A Lemley and Philip J Weiser, ‘Should Property or 
Liability Rules Govern Information?’ (2007) 85(4) Texas Law Review 783; Christina Bohannan, 
‘Copyright Harm and Injunctions’ (2012) 30(1) Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 11 
(‘Injunctions’). 
31  547 US 388 (2006). 
32  Ibid 391–4 (Thomas J for the Court) (2006). 
33  Ibid 391 (2006). 
34  See, eg, Salinger v Colting, 607 F 3d 68, 75–8 (2nd Cir, 2010) (in which, interestingly, the judgment was 
delivered by Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi); Perfect 10 Inc v Google Inc, 653 F 3d 976, 979–81 (Ikuta 
CJ) (9th Cir, 2011). 
35  The notion of copyright harm has been considered most extensively by United States (‘US’) legal 
scholars, and for this reason we refer quite heavily to US literature in this part. 
36  Christina Bohannan, ‘Copyright Harm, Foreseeability and Fair Use’ (2007) 85(5) Washington University 
Law Review 969, 973 (‘Fair Use’). 
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impact of infringement was much easier to measure because copyright granted 
only limited rights to protect against verbatim or close copying – copying, in other 
words, that was likely to cause direct and material harm to the copyright owner – 
but did not prevent the creation of derivative works.37 Bohannan, among others,38 
has argued that courts should be required to consider harm in the ordinary course 
of determining copyright infringement. For Bohannan, uses that are clearly 
harmful are those that substitute for the original work by supplanting the copyright 
owner’s expected markets.39 Harm is less apparent for highly transformative uses 
or for personal uses,40 or where the work is exploited in remote markets, which are 
markets that the copyright owner has chosen not to exploit or is unlikely to 
exploit.41 Christopher Sprigman, too, has argued that copyright law must be based 
on a theory of harm tied to author’s incentives; he writes, ‘we must understand the 
kinds of uses that cause significant harm to authors’ incentives, and those that do 
not, so that we might focus on regulating the former and not the latter’.42 In an 
Australian context, as we will see below, we would also add consideration of harm 
to authorial integrity, in addition to the author’s economic incentives. 
Few Australian courts have directly considered the notion of copyright harm, 
and they rarely make explicit their reasoning behind calculations of monetary 
damages.43 In one recent case, Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd [No 4], Justice 
Perram of the Federal Court refused to permit copyright owners to claim from 
alleged online file-sharers: a worldwide BitTorrent distribution licence fee, and 
punitive damages based on the number of other copyrighted works (aside from the 
particular film in question) that had been downloaded by the alleged infringer.44 
His Honour held that these claims were speculative and untenable.45 Instead, 
Justice Perram would only allow rights-holders to send letters to individuals 
claiming for: the cost to purchase a single copy of the relevant film; and the costs 
 
37  Ibid 970, 975. 
38  Bohannan, ‘Fair Use’ (n 36); Christina Bohannan, ‘Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech’ (2010) 
61(5) Hastings Law Journal 1083 (‘Copyright Infringement’); Bohannan, ‘Injunctions’ (n 30); 
Christopher Sprigman, ‘Copyright and the Rule of Reason’ (2009) 7(2) Journal on Telecommunications 
and High Technology Law 317; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives’ 
(2009) 122(6) Harvard Law Review 1569. 
39  Bohannan, ‘Copyright Infringement’ (n 38) 1134. 
40  Personal uses will not usually cause harm, because transaction costs are often prohibitive, relative to the 
value of the use, so a person is more likely to forgo the use than to pay the costs for licensing the use: see 
Bohannan, ‘Copyright Infringement’ (n 38) 1135, 1152, 1158; Bohannan, ‘Fair Use’ (n 36) 973–4, 1006–
8, 1016. 
41  The clearest example of this scenario is Castle Rock Entertainment v Carol Publishing Group Inc, 150 F 
3d 132 (2nd Cir, 1998) where a Seinfeld trivia book was found to be infringing, notwithstanding evidence 
that the copyright owners had consciously decided not to exploit the market for trivia books: see 136, 
138, 145–6 (Walker CJ) (2nd Cir, 1998). See also Perfect 10 Inc v Amazon.com Inc, 508 F 3d 1146 (9th 
Cir, 2007) where Ikuta CJ declined to find market harm, because Google’s use of thumbnail images for 
search served an entirely different purpose than the original images: at 1165–6 (9th Cir, 2007), and 
because Google’s market was remote from the plaintiff’s intended markets: at 1168 (9th Cir, 2007). 
42  Sprigman (n 38) 320. 
43  Trotter (n 14) 228–9.  
44  (2015) 327 ALR 702, 705–6 [15] [b], [c]. 
45  Ibid 710 [33]. 
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incurred by the plaintiff in obtaining the alleged infringer’s contact details.46 This 
was not a typical copyright infringement case, and these determinations were not 
made as part of an assessment of remedies. Nevertheless, Justice Perram’s 
judgment was a clear message to rights-holders that they should only be claiming 
for harms clearly and directly attributable to the copyright infringement at issue.47 
We argue that where economic harm cannot be identified, it should not be 
presumed in all infringement cases. Of course, where economic harm is apparent, 
even if it cannot be precisely quantified, an injunction and damages will likely be 
an appropriate remedy. Likewise, where there is a clear breach of moral rights then 
an injunction may also be appropriate. But where there is no evidence of economic 
harm and no breach of moral rights, a court should not presume economic harm 
where it does not clearly exist. In these situations, no more than nominal damages 
should be awarded. For many types of non-substitutive works, including 
transformative works, there is likely to be no or only trivial economic harm to the 
copyright owner. 
 
B   Australia’s Moral Rights Regime 
Australia introduced moral rights in 2000 following an extensive period of 
debate and a lengthy reform process that involved a number of government 
reviews.48 The moral rights provisions are set out in Part IX of the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth), and apply to individual creators only (not corporations).49 In 2004, 
moral rights protections were extended to performers, such as actors and singers 
in theatre performances and musical concerts.50 Moral rights protections last for 
the duration of copyright (generally, the life of the author plus 70 years) and cannot 
be assigned.51 While the enforcement of moral rights can be waived in particular 
circumstances,52 the general consensus is that moral rights cannot be waived 
absolutely in Australia.53 For individual creators, this is an important feature of the 
moral rights protections, especially since for other aspects of copyright 
 
46  Ibid 705–6 [15]–[18]. 
47  See also Kylie Pappalardo and Carrick Brough, ‘Dead Cats in the Mail: Dallas Buyers Club and the 
Emergence of the User in Australian Intermediary Copyright Law’ in John Gilchrist and Brian Fitzgerald 
(eds), Copyright, Property and the Social Contract: The Reconceptualisation of Copyright (Springer, 
2018) 241. 
48  See generally the parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction of the Copyright Amendment 
(Moral Rights) Bill 2000 (Cth): Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 
December 1999, 13026–8 (Daryl Williams); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 30 October 2000, 21647–59; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 31 October 2000, 21714–16 (Daryl Williams); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
Senate, 7 December 2000, 21060–7; Explanatory Memorandum, Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) 
Bill 1999 (Cth). See also Elizabeth Adeney, ‘Australia: Developments Towards the Current Law’ in 
Elizabeth Adeney (ed), The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers: An International and Comparative 
Analysis (Oxford University Press, 2006) 541. 
49  Copyright Act s 190. 
50  See ibid pt IX divs 2A, 3A, 4A. These provisions were added to the Copyright Act by the US Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act 2004 and came into effect in 2007.  
51  Copyright Act ss 195AM, 195AN (authors’ rights), 195ANA, 195ANB (performers’ rights). 
52  Ibid pt IX div 6 ss 195AW, 195AWA, 195AXJ. 
53  See Elizabeth Adeney, ‘Australia’s Experience of Moral Rights’ (Conference Paper, Moral Rights and 
New Technologies: Creativity and Authorship in a Digital World, 31 March 2017).  
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management there is often an uneven bargaining position in negotiating contracts 
with publishers and other intermediaries, and creators may be compelled to assign 
their economic rights.54 
Under Australian law, individual creators may assert their right to be attributed 
as the author of a work (section 193), the right not to have authorship of their work 
falsely attributed (section 195AC), and the right of integrity of authorship (section 
195AI). This last right is the most complicated and usually the least understood by 
the creative community. The right of integrity is defined in the Copyright Act as 
the right not to have the work subject to derogatory treatment.55 ‘Derogatory 
treatment’, in turn, is defined as a material distortion of, mutilation of or material 
alteration to a work, or doing anything in relation to a work that is prejudicial to 
the author’s honour or reputation.56 A straightforward reading of this definition 
seems to impute a subjective assessment into the definition of ‘derogatory 
treatment’, such that if an author perceives a slight to their honour or reputation 
their moral right of integrity will be infringed. But it is not this simple. Section 
195AS inserts a requirement that the treatment of a work also be unreasonable – 
the section provides that there will be no infringement of the right of integrity if 
the action or treatment was reasonable in the circumstances, taking into account 
various factors such as the nature of the work and the context in which is what 
used. The result is that ‘derogatory treatment’ is both a subjective and objective 
test, and one that is not easily determined.57 
Reasonableness is also a feature of the moral right of attribution. Section 
195AR provides that it is not an infringement of the author’s right of attribution if 
it was reasonable in all the circumstances not to identify the author.58 This 
provision allows some flexibility in the application of moral rights dependent on 
the type of work and the type of use. For example, what will be a reasonable 
attribution with respect to use of an artwork on a billboard is likely to be very 
different to what a reasonable attribution looks like for quoting from a literary 
work in a book or research article. 
There is very little case law on moral rights provisions in key common law 
jurisdictions, though this is perhaps not so surprising.59 Moral rights are designed 
 
54  Ruth Towse, ‘Copyright and Cultural Policy for the Creative Industries’ in Ove Granstrand (ed), 
Economics, Law and Intellectual Property: Seeking Strategies for Research and Teaching in a 
Developing Field (Springer-Science+Business Media, 2003) 419. 
55  Copyright Act s 195AI(2). 
56  Ibid ss 195AJ, 195AK, 195AL. 
57  See Nicolas Suzor, ‘Where the Bloody Hell Does Parody Fit in Australian Copyright Law?’ (2008) 13(2) 
Media and Arts Law Review 218, 246; Maree Sainsbury, Moral Rights and Their Application in Australia 
(Federation Press, 2003) 55–9. 
58  Subsections (2) and (3) of section 195AR of the Copyright Act list a series of matters to be taken into 
account when determining whether it was reasonable in the circumstances not to identify the author, 
including: the nature of the work; the purpose for which the work was used; the manner and context in 
which the work was used; industry practice; and any difficulty or expense that would have been incurred 
as a result of identifying the author. 
59  See the second reading speech for the Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Bill 1999 (Cth): 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 8 December 1999, 13026 (Daryl 
Williams, Attorney-General) (explaining that ‘enforcement of moral rights through the courts will be an 
exceptional occurrence’: at 13027). In Australia, cases include Meskenas v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd 
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for individual creators, who may not have the financial means to instigate costly 
court action against infringers. Most copyright infringement cases that reach the 
courts involve, on at least one side, large commercial actors with the economic 
means to initiate and sustain litigation. Further, moral rights infringement does not 
typically lead to significant monetary remedies.60 Particularly in the case of 
missing or incorrect attribution, the best remedy may simply be to rectify the 
omission or mistake. This can often be achieved through asking; in practice, this 
is typically handled without litigation. Nevertheless, our empirical research reveals 
that moral rights protections are extremely important to both Australian creators 
and copyright users. As discussed further below, we propose that moral rights 
might be given more weight within the copyright system by being considered as 
part of the determination of remedies in infringement cases. This is one way in 
which the notion of copyright harm – as understood and articulated by creators – 
can be better acknowledged and given meaning in light of the discretionary nature 
of equitable remedies.61 
 
III   QUALITATIVE METHODS 
This paper presents qualitative empirical research with Australian creators and 
copyright consumers. Our goal was to better understand how copyright harm is 
conceptualised and experienced in practice. This is particularly pertinent for 
creators who are working with culture as part of their everyday practice. The 
documentation of everyday experiences helps to inform the determination of 
whether copyright infringement should be treated under a property rule (where 
irreparable harm is presumed) or a liability rule (where it is not). 
Between November 2016 and April 2017, we conducted semi-structured 
interviews with self-identified Australian creators and consumers. We used 
snowball sampling to recruit participants, through word-of-mouth and email. 
Creators came from a variety of artforms, including: documentary filmmakers; 
literary authors; musicians, including composers, DJs and sampling artists; ‘VJs’ 
(creators who sample visual material as well as sounds); YouTube creators and 
video remix artists; and visual artists, including street artists. The creators we 
spoke to had various levels of expertise, ranging from emerging creators (less than 
five years’ experience in their relevant field) to established creators (more than 20 
years’ experience in their field and an established reputation).62 In our creator 
 
(2006) 70 IPR 172 (concerning attribution) and Perez v Fernandez (2012) 260 FLR 1 (‘Perez’) 
(concerning integrity). 
60  Unlike in Perez (2012) 260 FLR 1, where the plaintiff was awarded $10,000 for infringement of his 
moral right of integrity: at 19 [107] (Driver FM). Importantly, the large damages award seemed mostly 
driven by two considerations: the fact that the song had not yet been released in Australia, and that the 
defendant had ‘benefited by falsely representing a positive association between himself and Mr Perez’: at 
12 [69], 15 [86] (Driver FM). 
61  We understand that plaintiff copyright owners will not always be ‘creators’ and may instead be corporate 
entities with wholly commercial interests. We focus in this article on cases involving creators. 
62  For a more detailed breakdown of interviewee demographics, see Kylie Pappalardo et al, Imagination 
Foregone: A Qualitative Study of the Reuse Practices of Australian Creators (Report, November 2017).  
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sample, there were 10 participants who identified as female and 19 participants 
who identified as male. The consumers we interviewed self-identified as 
individuals who regularly used social media and engaged with creative content 
online. In our consumer sample, there were 11 participants who identified as 
female and 5 participants who identified as male. None of our participants 
identified as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander.  
Creators were interviewed individually, and consumers were interviewed in 
groups of two to six people to support ongoing discussion and conversation. 
Interviews typically ran for between 40 and 90 minutes. Interviews with creators 
were conducted either in-person (in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne) or via 
Skype for those participants located rurally or in Perth. The consumer interviews 
were all held in Sydney.  
During the interviews, participants were asked open-ended questions about 
their understanding of copyright, the importance of copyright, whether they had 
sought permission to use or redistribute creative work, and what the process for 
getting permission was like for them. They were also asked about their response if 
they were refused permission. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. We then 
conducted thematic analysis of the data collected. We coded for themes around 
participants’ understanding of the law, practices of re-use, experience with 
copyright licensing, reliance on copyright exceptions, problems encountered in re-
use, and responses to problems encountered. The participants interviewed all had 
some experience with reusing existing content, whether through using samples or 
snippets in music or film, appropriation art, remix, or quotation. For this reason, 
our study is not representative of all creators or all stakeholders in copyright law, 
particularly copyright owners. 
We are conscious that identifying our participants as consumers or creators 
sets up an unproductive (and unrealistic) binary between the two participant 
groups. Recent work on relationality and copyright has pointed out that arbitrarily 
understanding authors, users, consumers and infringers as separate actors is not a 
conceptually sound approach.63 Therefore, while we asked individuals to self-
identify as either creators or consumers, we approached these categories as 
malleable and, indeed, our data supported this conceptual approach. We found that 
people actually engaged in a wide variety of practices from creation to 
infringement, regardless of how they viewed themselves. Creators used 
copyrighted work in ways that might be deemed consumptive, and consumers 
engaged in ordinary (or vernacular) creative practice.64 This ultimately speaks to 
the results of our data, which showed that both participant groups had very 
nuanced understandings of what it means to create, use and infringe copyrighted 
works. Importantly, the attitudes and behaviours of both groups coalesce around a 
series of practices that directly align with the moral rights provisions in the 
Copyright Act.  
 
63  See Carys J Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture: Towards a Relational Theory of Copyright 
Law (Edward Elgar, 2011); James Meese, Authors, Users, and Pirates: Copyright Law and Subjectivity 
(MIT Press, 2018) (‘Authors, Users, and Pirates’).  
64  See Jean Burgess, ‘Hearing Ordinary Voices: Cultural Studies, Vernacular Creativity and Digital 
Storytelling’ (2006) 20(2) Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 201.  
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IV   RESPECTFUL RE-USE: AUSTRALIAN CREATORS AND RE-
USE NORMS 
Within copyright scholarship, qualitative data from creators is scarce.65 There 
are some exceptions in the United States, such as research by Professor Jessica 
Silbey, which demonstrates that intellectual property owners value their 
‘autonomy and identity’ and ‘relationships (between people, among audiences, and 
within a community)’ often more than they worry about small-scale infringements 
of their work.66 Silbey conducts in-depth, face-to-face interviews with artists, 
scientists and engineers, and their lawyers, agents and business partners, to 
understand their lived experiences with creating and innovating, and how 
intellectual property law intervenes in their lives.67 Silbey observes that artists and 
business persons often have a particular tolerance for copyright infringement.68 She 
posits that this tolerance exists because creators understand that their own creative 
processes involve a complex mix of originality and re-use, sometimes through 
infringement.69 In fact, she notes that ‘[i]nterviewees struggled to draw a line 
between their own contribution to the final work and works from which they 
borrowed in their field’.70 Thus, tolerating infringement was a way of ‘making 
room for play and experimentation … a precursor to the act of creation or 
discovery’.71 
In our own empirical work, we found that a similar set of values emerged. 
Creators placed a strong emphasis on the granting and receiving of ‘respect’ 
between and amongst creators, which almost always entailed, at a minimum, 
attribution. With the exception of one street artist who operated anonymously, all 
of the creators we interviewed indicated that giving and receiving attribution was 
central to their creative practice.72 An interactive media creator stated, ‘I’m very 
conscious that credit is given where credit is due’. ‘We always credit the work’, 
said one creator. ‘It’s just good old-fashioned etiquette’, another said. A DJ 
 
65  For qualitative studies in Australia, see Andrew T Kenyon and Robin Wright, ‘Whose Conflict? 
Copyright, Creators and Cultural Institutions’ (2010) 33(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 
286; Matthew Rhys Rimmer, ‘The Pirate Bazaar: The Social Life of Copyright Law’ (PhD Thesis, 
University of New South Wales, 2001). In the United States, see Jessica Silbey, The Eureka Myth: 
Creators, Innovators and Everyday Intellectual Property (Stanford University Press, 2014) (‘The Eureka 
Myth’). See also studies by Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, as discussed in Reclaiming Fair Use: 
How to Put Balance Back in Copyright (University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed, 2018).  
66  Silbey, The Eureka Myth (n 65) 153.  
67  See ibid; Jessica Silbey, ‘Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-Makes-
Work,” Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators’ (2011) 86(5) Notre Dame Law 
Review 2091; Jessica Silbey, ‘IP and Ethnography: A Qualitative Research Approach’ in Irene Calboli 
and Lilla Montagnani (eds), Oxford Handbook on Intellectual Property Research (Oxford University 
Press, 2019).  
68  Jessica Silbey, ‘Fairer Uses’ (2016) 96 Boston University Law Review 857, 860. 
69  Ibid 859–61. 
70  Silbey, The Eureka Myth (n 65) 46. 
71  Ibid 45. 
72  Pappalardo et al (n 62) 31. See also Patricia Aufderheide et al, ‘Calculating the Consequences of Narrow 
Australian Copyright Exceptions: Measurable, Hidden and Incalculable Costs to Creators’ (2018) 69 
Poetics 15.  
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musician elaborated on the link, for her, between attribution, honesty and 
relationship-building: 
It’s fine when you credit it, because then it puts it into context. But without that 
you’re creating a false presentation, I think, when you do that. I think that’s a big – 
I would hate to piss off any of my heroes from the ’80s that are still – a lot of them 
are still around, still producing. 
In general, creators also expected the same courtesy to be extended to them if 
their work was re-used by someone else. Commonly expressed sentiments 
included: ‘I would expect, at a minimum, attribution, most definitely’, and ‘I’d 
want to be attributed. That’s pretty important’.  
Our data also supported Silbey’s findings that creators often have a level of 
tolerance for copyright infringement, particularly non-substitutive uses. For 
example, the front-person of a well-known band told us, when discussing other 
people sampling the band’s music: ‘Our old record label at one point wanted to 
sue someone and we were just like, you’re crazy. Like what are you doing? We’re 
not comfortable with that at all’. 
The interviewee indicated that while they had no problem with users sharing 
or building upon their music, they would expect credit to be given back to the band. 
Similarly, other creators variously stated: 
For me, the line’s drawn where – if someone’s taken your work, as it is, in saying 
that it’s theirs completely – straight plagiarism. But I’m open to – yeah, various 
forms of sampling and what not. 
I wouldn’t want to think that somebody else was getting the credit for my work 
either. I’m very – I’m happy to be acknowledged. I’ve never said no to anybody if 
they’d wanted to either quote from an article I’ve written or sometimes even 
reproduce an article I’ve written or a piece of music. 
It’s not always necessarily about money and distribution. It can be, well, you know 
you’ve got to credit me properly so people know where it’s come from. 
So I’m not being too strict with copyright. I’m happy with re-distributions of my 
work if there’s a credit in there and I get some growth. That’s usually all I’ll chase 
people up for and ask about. 
The word ‘plagiarism’ arose repeatedly in our interviews, indicating that our 
interviewees were less concerned about their content being re-used per se and more 
concerned about the erasure of their artistic identity through unattributed use. 
‘Plagiarism’ is a very different word from ‘stealing’, which is sometimes used 
within the literature and in industry to stress the framing of copyright interests as 
property with the associated property-based remedies for infringement.73 
Even more than attribution, though, creators were anxious to ensure that their 
re-use practices were respectful to other creators in their field. ‘Respect’ is a tricky 
concept, but arguably no more so than ‘integrity of authorship’ in the moral rights 
provisions of the Copyright Act. The norms that creators follow to show each other 
‘respect’ may, in fact, be the closest thing we have to the moral right of integrity 
operating in practice. Norms are likely to differ slightly between different artforms 
and industries, but there are commonalities too. For the creators we interviewed, 
 
73  Patricia Loughlan, ‘“You Wouldn’t Steal a Car …”: Intellectual Property and the Language of Theft’ 
(2007) 29(10) European Intellectual Property Review 401; Peter K Yu, ‘Digital Copyright and 
Confuzzling Rhetoric’ (2011) 13(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 881, 891. 
2019 In Support of Tolerated Use  
 
941
‘respectful’ re-use of a work was partly contingent on the level of transformative-
ness of the use and the subsequent creativity employed. Most creators were happy 
for another person to re-use or remix their work, provided that the uses employed 
some creativity and were not blatant ‘rip offs’.74 In other words, the use should not 
be an attempt to use the work as is without further creative input (unless permission 
is obtained) and should not be an attempt to pass off the work as the user’s own. 
Even where the use was done without authorisation, many creators were not 
concerned so long as the subsequent use was transformative. This sentiment was 
consistent across all artforms. An online content creator told us, ‘If there was an 
intent to have a conversation with the work and continue the work in some way 
rather than trying to pretend as if it’s their own, I’d have no problem with it. I 
would be flattered that someone wanted to do that’. Other creators also expressed 
this notion that creative re-use was flattering rather than concerning. An author 
said, ‘In some ways I think I would be more flattered than annoyed about that. If 
someone actually took the time to read [my work] and was so affected that they 
had to create something from it that would actually be an amazing outcome from 
a work’.75 
For musicians and sampling artists, respectful re-use also required a 
willingness to have difficult conversations about whether the use of a particular 
sample detracted from the original work. The emerging artists we interviewed 
indicated that they would willingly remove their own remixes from the internet if 
the artist that they sampled contacted them to express unhappiness with the work. 
The norm, as expressed to us, was that re-use without permission was acceptable 
so long as good faith efforts were made to do justice to the original and there was 
space, after the fact of the use, to have conversations with the original artists about 
whether the remix was respectful. A musician explained, ‘If [the original creator 
was] saying they weren’t down with it, I would – I’d be like, I need to step my 
game up. That’s a positive outcome. … I wouldn’t want to devalue the music that 
I’m sampling’.  
Creators presented a notion of ‘respectful re-use’ that was more nuanced than 
requiring only favourable uses. In other words, ‘respect’ did not necessarily 
exclude uses that were critical of the original or which employed parody or satire. 
What mattered was that the use served a deeper creative purpose than free-riding, 
and that the use was not done in bad faith. Again, creators used principles of 
transformative-ness and facilitating ongoing dialogue with the original artwork or 
creator as a means of distinguishing between proper and improper re-use. An 
online content creator said to us, in the context of complaining about improper 
copying of their own works: ‘I think the distinction has to be made between the 
way we’re using content – which is parody and satire, and using elements of an 
original and transforming it into something else – and what is happening to us, 
which is people just taking the entire content’. Several interviewees had stories of 
their own works being copied, wholesale, for another’s commercial gain, such as 
artwork being printed onto t-shirts or dresses and sold to members of the public 
 
74  Pappalardo et al (n 62) 33–5. 
75  Ibid 34. 
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without permission. Interviewees told us that this behaviour was never acceptable, 
and was most definitely disrespectful.76 
We asked creators whether they considered commercial uses to be more 
problematic than non-commercial uses. No creator indicated that a person should 
never make money from re-use. However, many differentiated between large-scale 
commercial uses or uses that generated significant revenue, on the one hand, and 
uses by small-scale artists or organisations, or which generated only small sums of 
money, on the other.77 Most were unconcerned by uses of their work that derived 
only small amounts of money, even if the user had not sought permission for the 
use. The following exchange was typical in our interviews: 
Facilitator: Does money change things for you, if they were making money 
   off of it would that change things? 
Interviewee: Yeah, I guess it would but only if they were making heaps of  
   money. Yeah if it was not much money then I wouldn’t really  
   care about it either.  
Copyright law is premised on the principle of authorised use – that is, 
permission before re-use.78 However, the creators we interviewed struggled with 
obtaining prior permission for re-use, largely because the processes for licensing 
works can be time-consuming, expensive and counter-intuitive. Publishers and 
large commercial copyright owners often require paperwork to be completed to 
request permission, and this paperwork can be long and complicated. Many 
creators complained about the time taken to request and negotiate licences; 
experienced creators reported that they generally expect to invest months in this 
process, even for very small samples and straightforward uses. Even after this 
investment of time, many large rights-holder organisations never responded to 
emails or requests for permission, or they simply denied permission without 
providing reasons or options for adjustment. Creators told us that they felt 
disrespected by this, and that this impersonal and lengthy system for seeking 
permission was disruptive and detrimental to their creative process. They wanted 
to create and to be driven by their creativity – not be chasing their tails seeking 
permissions for minor uses. Creators also felt that the legal permissions system 
contradicted, in many ways, the kinds of respectful re-use and artist-to-artist 
conversations that they were seeking. ‘[The] whole process of the politeness of 
asking is not facilitated’, one creator said. ‘There’s nothing polite about all of these 
forms and all that sort of stuff’.79 Creators preferred, in general, to make use of a 
work first, and then have a discussion about the use with the copyright owner or 
original artists later, if necessary. At that point, the creator would be in a better 
position to explain how their own use builds upon the previous work, or transforms 
it; what they have done to exhibit respect (including attribution); and whether the 
use is expected to generate revenue (unlikely, but possible). 
 
76  Ibid 35. 
77  See also Kenyon and Wright (n 65) 295, which found a similar emphasis on commercial uses by creators: 
‘[T]he point that appeared to distinguish whether payment was seen as being necessary or not, for many 
of our respondents from both the creator and institutional sectors, was the concept of commercial use’. 
78  Copyright Act ss 36(1), 101(1). See also Wu (n 5) 618. 
79  Pappalardo et al (n 62).  
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V   CREDIT AND CIRCULATE: CONSUMER DISTRIBUTION OF 
ONLINE CONTENT 
Our interviews with consumers focused on low-level copying and sharing that 
generally does not interfere with copyright owners’ licensing markets. The types 
of uses that our consumer interviewees engaged in included making and sharing 
memes (which might include copyrighted images or snippets of video),80 and 
posting content to personal social media pages (eg, on Facebook or Instagram). 
Our interviews revealed that consumers saw attribution as an important ethic, but 
one that was hard to enact in practice. Participants noted that in an online 
environment where content circulated freely, making sure a creator was named 
was vital. When asked whether the original creator of an image or video seen 
online mattered, a typical initial response from a participant was that if they could 
find the original source they would ‘always credit it’. Expanding on this 
requirement to attribute, another participant noted a disquiet with sharing 
unattributed content, saying: ‘[I]f I stole a girl’s funny quote or her image and 
made out that I was there or something … I don’t know, I just wouldn’t do that’. 
Some participants went into further detail and made reference to attribution 
standards on different social media platforms, such as the ‘bookstagram’ 
community on Instagram (organised around the hashtag #bookstagram). One 
participant explained the attribution model that operated in this community: 
What a lot of people will do is they’ll put their handle on their photos but they’ll 
also do things where you can regram their photos for promotion, so the thing is 
you’re … using their photo as a … self-promoting kind of thing but also they’re 
okay with it. 
These responses signalled attribution as a critical part of the online 
infrastructure and a practice that had found its way into numerous online 
communities.  
Despite the acknowledged importance of attribution, there was some 
contestation amongst participants about its precise role. A vocal minority felt that 
simply providing attribution did not authorise further distribution, particularly 
when one considered the growing commercial viability of curated meme pages on 
Instagram. Another participant noted that some content hubs explicitly require 
people to submit original content, and that they paid for content featured on their 
Facebook page. However, when discussing recirculation by audience members, 
the majority of consumer respondents argued that as long as they attributed work, 
they should be able to circulate it. Many linked this view on copyright law to the 
overall operation of the internet, explaining ‘the internet [was sold as] this place 
of free content and free expression’ and that ‘you put it on the web and it’s there 
 
80  ‘[I]n contemporary popular usage an internet “meme” is a faddish joke or practice (like a humorous way 
of captioning cat pictures) that becomes widely imitated’: Jean Burgess, ‘“All Your Chocolate Rain Are 
Belong to Us?”: Viral Video, YouTube and the Dynamics of Participatory Culture’ in Nikos 
Papastergiadis and Victoria Lynn (eds), Art in the Global Present (UTS ePress, 2014) 86, 87; ‘The term 
“meme” was coined by biologist Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene (1976) to refer to small 
cultural units of transmission, analogous to genes, which are spread by copying or imitation’: Limor 
Shifman, ‘An Anatomy of a YouTube Meme’ (2011) 14(2) New Media & Society 187, 188. See also 
Limor Shifman, Memes in Digital Culture (MIT Press, 2014). 
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to be shared’. The dominance of this approach could also be linked to the strong 
attribution norms found in online communities,81 with participants citing 
attribution practices on Instagram and Tumblr as models, where professional and 
amateur creators use attribution mechanisms to tacitly endorse sharing and the 
ongoing circulation of content. 
However, as the interviews continued, participants conceded that the 
practicalities of attribution online raised a number of issues, which meant that their 
redistribution of content did not always match up with their idealised practices. 
One noted that the interfaces of many social media platforms were not set up to 
support attribution, which caused them to often forget to properly credit the content 
they were sharing: 
[T]he way it’s set up you don’t think about copyright. You’re not consciously going, 
‘Oh should I–’ Or at least I’m not consciously going, ‘Should I credit this person in 
what they do?’ It’s just you’re actively consuming content, and there’s so much 
content there that the copyright and the crediting of someone who created that 
content is so minimal to what you’re consuming so it just falls to the wayside. 
Another participant highlighted the difficulties involved with using copyright 
images. He explained that the simple production of posters for a club night, which 
used scans of 1980s music magazines from Flickr raised a lot of questions around 
attribution, which he could not answer. Who got the credit? Was it ‘the guy that 
scanned the magazine and posted it, or is it the magazine that’s no longer in 
business? Where did these scans come from in the first place? Did Flickr need a 
shout-out?’ Others noted that some forms of content did not seem to require 
attribution, explaining that in their opinion ‘when people create these memes they 
don’t actually expect to be credited’. A participant asked, ‘[when you’re] trying to 
be light-hearted and funny … do you need to credit that when it’s so far removed 
from where it started?’  
In the case of memes, we could see a lay understanding of ‘reasonableness’ 
emerge, with some participants making judgments about what was seen to be 
reasonable attribution in the context of a particular work. While participants had 
strong opinions about attributing content, memes stood as a notable outlier for 
certain participants, who suggested that attribution was not required. Such an 
approach shows that these individuals carried an understanding of the context in 
which a work was created and were able to articulate a standard of reasonableness 
as a result. Indeed, it shows that while consumers struggle with attribution, their 
values align with the reasonableness defence, incorporating a range of issues 
including the nature, purpose and context of the work in addition to established 
practice.82 In an ideal world, our participants would aim to attribute most online 
creative works, with a subset suggesting that this would not be required for 
remixable content like memes. 
 
81  Katharina Freund, ‘“Fair Use is Legal Use”: Copyright Negotiations and Strategies in the Fan-Vidding 
Community’ (2016) 18(7) New Media & Society 1347, 1356–8; Sal Humphreys, ‘The Challenges of 
Intellectual Property for Users of Social Networking Sites: A Case Study of Ravelry’ (Conference Paper, 
Mind Trek, 7–9 October 2008); Dan Perkel, ‘Share Wars: Sharing, Theft, and the Everyday Production of 
Web 2.0 on DeviantArt’ (2016) 21(6) First Monday 6795:1–19 
<https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6795/5526>.  
82  See Copyright Act ss 195, 195AR. 
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Concerns were also raised about the inequities of attribution, infringement and 
audiences. Creators with large online audiences could actively use their fans to 
challenge companies who allegedly infringed their copyright or design, or failed 
to attribute their work. One participant explained, ‘Big companies can get called 
out on social media when the designer is like, “This is mine, and this is what 
they’ve done. What do you think, did they rip me off?”’ However, as another 
participant went on to note, ‘that doesn’t happen for everyone, not everyone has a 
little fan base that’s keeping an eye on what’s happening in the interwebs’. Some 
of our participants were most likely referencing the furore surrounding fashion 
label Zara, who has repeatedly been accused of copying the designs of smaller 
artists, most notably Tuesday Bassen. Bassen publicised her complaint against 
Zara in mid-July 2016 and received a significant amount of support online (her 
Instagram was regularly receiving between 7,000 and 42,000 likes)83 and 
international press.84 Bassen was joined by a number of other independent artists, 
who banded together and set up Shop Art Theft, which aims to support artists who 
have allegedly had their work copied.85 However, our participants were obviously 
conscious that other creators might not be able to draw on a similarly strong online 
community if their work was not as popular, or if the alleged infringer was less 
prominent. 
Indeed, most participants felt that making money from unlicensed copyrighted 
content was not appropriate. Previous work drawing on the data (conducted by one 
of the authors), showed that participants ‘drew a clear line between non-
commercial circulation … and the commercial exploitation of copyrighted 
content’.86 While participants described social media as a place where people could 
share content freely, they were aware of various power imbalances that could occur 
between creators and businesses seeking to make money off the back of user-
generated content. In deciding whether uses were appropriate, our participants 
would weigh up whether the use of content was supporting a creator, was non-
commercial and non-substitutive, or was actively harming a creator’s potential 
income stream. 
It is also important to consider the relational nature of these consumers and 
recognise that many of them also use and create content as well as consume it.87 
As noted in our methods, we divided our participants into groups based on their 
own self-identification as either creators or consumers in response to specific calls 
for participation. However, throughout the consumer interviews, participants also 
indicated that they viewed themselves as creators of content (although not always 
 
83  See tuesdaybassen (Instagram) <https://www.instagram.com/tuesdaybassen/?hl=en>. Examples of posts 
with thousands of likes include: tuesdaybassen (Instagram, 20 July 2016) 
<https://www.instagram.com/p/BIEGImxgFKe/>; tuesdaybassen (Instagram, 25 July 2016) 
<https://www.instagram.com/p/BIP3845DDfX/>.  
84  Nicole Puglise, ‘Fashion Brand Zara Accused of Copying LA Artist’s Designs’, The Guardian (online, 
21 July 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2016/jul/21/zara-accused-copying-artist-designs-
fashion>. 
85  See shoparttheft, ‘About This Blog’ Shop Art Theft (Web Page) <http://shoparttheft.tumblr.com/>. 
86  James Meese and Jennifer Hagedorn, ‘Mundane Content on Social Media: Creation, Circulation, and the 
Copyright Problem’ [2019] (April–June) Social Media + Society 1, 6. 
87  See Craig (n 63) 25; Meese, Authors, Users, and Pirates (n 63) 3–4. 
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economically viable content) on social media platforms, a position that shaped 
their views around attribution. For example, an ethic of attribution and respect was 
clearly articulated in this response to a question about how participants would feel 
if their content was taken from a social media platform and re-used: 
I think for me, if someone’s taking something of mine without asking and then 
saying it’s their own, then I’d be pretty mad about that. If they’re taking something 
of mine without asking, but crediting me for it, that’s not ideal, but I wouldn’t be 
too fussed about it. 
Others repeated the point that their content was online, which meant that it was 
open to be shared, ‘[because] if people can access my content and I’ve set up my 
privacy settings to allow them to do that, then I’ve got no issue with it’. With the 
re-use of their own content largely only becoming problematic when people earned 
money from it, most participants were happy with others circulating their content 
so long as it was attributed. They maintained this standard as an ideal approach 
(albeit not always strictly applied) when working with other people’s content. 
While participants were, in general, very forthright with their views on 
attribution, the consideration of their own creativity online did not lead to 
substantive discussions around the protection of a work’s integrity. Only one group 
interview briefly touched on the use of consumers’ own copyrighted works in a 
derogatory manner, but participants considered these issues to be defamatory and 
in breach of their privacy, rather than an infringement of their moral rights. 
 
VI   IMPLICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 
We can draw a number of findings from our empirical studies involving 
consumers and creators. First, what IP lawyers think of as ‘moral rights’ – the right 
to be correctly attributed and the right of integrity – are important to both creators 
and consumers, though creators generally discuss integrity using the language of 
‘respect’. Both participant groups thought primarily in terms of norms around 
attribution and respect when they considered and discussed copying, re-use and 
sharing of materials. Second, nearly all of our participants expressed preference 
for respectful, attributed use without prior permission, rather than copyright’s 
current system which requires permission before use. It might seem obvious that 
consumers would prefer a system where they could use and share copyrighted 
content for free, without prior licence. But this preference was also true for many 
of the creators we interviewed, who have much stronger economic interests in 
copyright’s licensing models. We acknowledge that this preference may be more 
pronounced for the types of creators we interviewed, whose creative practices all 
involved elements of re-use, than it might be for other, more ‘traditional’ creators.88 
Nevertheless, our findings align with the body of theoretical literature that argues 
that all creativity involves re-use and reconceptualisation.89 The creators we 
 
88  We recognise that some creators and copyright owners may not share the views on copyright re-use and 
harm reflected in our study. 
89  See, eg, Henry Jenkins, Sam Ford and Joshua Green, Spreadable Media: Creating Value and Meaning in 
a Networked Culture (New York University Press, 2013); Aram Sinnreich, Mashed Up: Music, 
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interviewed were highly aware of the recombinant nature of creativity, even if 
copyright lawyers sometime overlook this feature. Third, our data suggests that a 
great deal of use without permission is happening anyway, even though such uses 
are technically infringing and even though some creators and consumers are aware 
that this is unlawful. In his book, Free Culture, Harvard Professor Lawrence 
Lessig famously argued that overly strong copyright laws were turning the 
American public – ordinary citizens doing ordinary things with copyrighted 
content – into criminals.90 Australian copyright law mimics American copyright 
law in almost every way, except that we do not have the broad fair use exception 
to infringement that Americans enjoy. In short, our system is even more restrictive 
for Australian creators and consumers than the United States (‘US’) copyright 
system. Australians are already accused of being copyright ‘criminals’ – 
Australian consumers have some of the highest rates of unlawful downloading in 
the world.91 Efforts by the Australian government and rights-holders to legislate, 
regulate, coerce or educate away this infringing behaviour have largely failed.92 In 
this part, we posit a gentler approach – what if we sought to better align law with 
practice through the determination of copyright remedies? This would not require 
any changes to the infringement test or any new exceptions, nor would it constrain 
everyday cultural practices with heavier enforcement.93 But it might help to 
address copyright’s legitimacy problem in the digital age.94 Below, we outline 
some of our key ideas for how creator and consumer practices might inform and 
improve the functioning of copyright law. 
 
A   Supporting Tolerated Use 
The copyright uses we have focused on in this article are exactly the types of 
uses that tend to fall within the space of ‘tolerated use’ – uses that are either highly 
transformative but unlicensed, or which are harmless and often banal. Our data 
indicates that for many creators and users, working within the space of tolerated 
use is both ordinary and a perfectly reasonable thing to do. 
But copyright is a permissions-based game. The risk for users and creators who 
elect to operate within the realm of tolerated use, therefore, is that at any moment 
the copyright owner may decide not to be so tolerant. The ‘grey zone’ may rapidly 
 
Technology, and the Rise of Configurable Culture (University of Massachusetts Press, 2010); Kembrew 
McLeod and Peter DiCola, Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling (Duke University 
Press, 2011); Joseph Schloss, Making Beats: The Art of Sample-Based Hip-Hop (Wesleyan University 
Press, 2004); Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and 
How It Threatens Creativity (New York University Press, 2001). 
90  Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity (Penguin Books, 2004) 205–7. 
91  See Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government, ‘Online Copyright Infringement’ 
(Discussion Paper, 30 July 2014) 1 <https://apo.org.au/node/40630>; Dootson and Suzor (n 15). 
92  See Attorney-General’s Department (n 91). See also Dan Hunter and Nicolas Suzor, ‘Claiming the Moral 
High Ground in the Copyright Wars’ in Phillipa McGuinness (ed), Copyfight (NewSouth, 2015) 131. The 
same is true in the United States: see Mark Lemley, ‘IP in a World Without Scarcity’ (2015) 90 New York 
University Law Review 460, 462; William Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
93  It is worth noting, however, that this article is not intended to close off discussion about the merits of a 
fair use defence or more extensive fair dealing exceptions in Australia. 
94  See Dootson and Suzor (n 15) 233–4. 
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diminish on a copyright owner’s whim.95 While tolerated use is so-called precisely 
because it is rarely litigated, the potential for litigation may nevertheless present 
enough of a threat to stifle production by some creators. Several of the creators we 
interviewed in our study spoke of the pervasive anxiety they feel about copyright 
lawsuits. One filmmaker noted that even though she tries to do the right thing, ‘it 
is one of those crazy fears that you have as a creator that somewhere you’ve done 
the wrong thing and you’re going to get done for it in terms of copyright’. Another 
creator described this as an ‘inbuilt fear’ of getting sued.96 
While a ‘tolerated use’ is technically an infringing use, and one that a rights-
holder may choose to dispute, it is generally a use that does not cause any clear 
harm to the copyright owner. As noted earlier, the concept of ‘copyright harm’ is 
unsettled and under-developed. Among those who have considered what copyright 
harm means, there is a consensus that one of the best indications of likely harm is 
substitutability in the market.97 The more that a defendant ‘changes the meaning, 
message or purpose of a work, the less likely the use is to substitute for the 
copyright owner’s work or its most foreseeable derivatives’ and the less likely it 
is that the use will harm the copyright owner.98 Thus, in the context of the uses that 
we describe, we take ‘harm’ to mean market substitution for the original work.99 
In most remix and sampling work, and in creations like documentary films or 
parodies, no substitution for the original occurs. The market for the original work 
continues unabated and in some cases may even receive a boost because of the re-
use. Often, therefore, there may be no financial harm for which a copyright owner 
needs compensation.  
This argument holds in many cases of small-scale infringement of works 
reproduced in their entirety online through social media platforms. The assumption 
that every reproduction results in economic loss to the copyright owner is difficult 
to sustain in a media environment which operates on reproduction and sharing.100 
An assessment of harm would take into account the significant changes that have 
occurred in digital media markets, which sees a value and business for creators 
being generated through individual and algorithmic circulation. Instagram artists, 
for example, are starting to gain meaningful opportunities through the publication 
and circulation of their work online.101 Brands and major companies are producing 
content with the aim of it being shared repeatedly, ‘“scattering” content broadly 
and then “gathering” potential supporters’.102 Our consumer respondents 
 
95  Tehranian (n 6) xxi. 
96  Pappalardo et al (n 62) 23.  
97  See Bohannan, ‘Fair Use’ (n 36). See also Bohannan, ‘Copyright Infringement’ (n 38); Sprigman (n 38).  
98  Bohannan, ‘Fair Use’ (n 36) 1006. 
99  In accordance with the views expressed by our interviewees, harm might also be occasioned where a 
substantial part of an existing work is used in a highly commercial venture (one that makes ‘heaps of 
money’) without accounting to the original creator: see, eg, Pappalardo et al (n 62) 17. These are also 
circumstances which can be considered by a court in assessing remedies under a liability rule: see 
Copyright Act s 115. 
100  See Dootson and Suzor (n 15) 223. See also Jenkins, Ford and Green (n 89); Jenny Kennedy, ‘Conceptual 
Boundaries of Sharing’ (2016) 19(4) Information, Communication & Society 461. 
101  See, eg, Hannah Keegan, ‘The Rise of the Instagram Artist’, The Economist (online, 5 October 2017) 
<https://www.1843magazine.com/culture/the-daily/the-rise-of-the-instagram-artist>.  
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understood this environment of content consumption and viewed many of their 
actions as essentially non-commercial reproductions, which did not directly 
substitute (and in some cases enhanced) the market of the original copyrighted 
work. Considering that many content producers are working towards 
‘spreadability’,103 a finding of harm would need to take into account the specific 
market contexts in which the reproduction takes place. In the context of 
consumption and production through digital and social media, small-scale 
infringements are unlikely to qualify as harmful. 
For uses which do not serve as a substitute for the original work, either because 
they are minimal or because they are highly transformative, it makes sense to align 
copyright practice with creative practice – to inject norms into the analysis.104 
Creators have extremely robust norms about what ‘respectful re-use’ entails. They 
are guided by ethical norms relating to attribution; to the degree of commerciality 
of the re-use; and to the level of creative engagement with the original work, 
whether through transforming or speaking back to the original work.105 Similarly, 
consumers on social media platforms are acutely aware of attribution norms in 
using and sharing online content. Our argument is that where creators and 
consumers engage with existing copyright content in a way that is formally 
unsanctioned but otherwise in line with norms of practice, they should be permitted 
some confidence that this respectful re-use will not result in serious legal penalties. 
How can this support be achieved as a matter of law? One important and 
eminently achievable way is to consider creative and cultural norms as part of the 
assessment of remedies in infringement cases. Courts tend to presume that 
infringement causes irreparable harm to a copyright owner, but equity does not 
require them to make that presumption.106 Injunctions are a discretionary remedy.107 
In situations where the defendant’s use does not clearly threaten an established 
licensing market and is non-substitutive, why not treat infringement under a 
liability rule? Australian courts could take guidance from the US Supreme Court 
in requiring a plaintiff to show that they have suffered or will suffer irreparable 
harm without an injunction and that monetary remedies are inadequate.108 This 
would have the additional advantage of discouraging more frivolous suits and 
encouraging action only where the plaintiff has been demonstrably harmed.109 
Where the use does not result in a market substitute and does not cause direct 
 
103  Ibid 3. 
104  Law should not always follow norms, particularly where norms have been cultivated in situations 
involving serious power imbalances: see Jennifer E Rothman, ‘In the Shadow of the Law: The Role of 
Custom in Intellectual Property’ in Ben Depoorter and Peter Menell (eds), Research Handbook on the 
Economics of Intellectual Property, Volume 1: Theory (Edward Elgar, 2019) ch 20. However, we submit 
that the norms of creators and creative communities are a useful guide for the copyright law that purports 
to regulate creative practice and re-use. 
105  Pappalardo et al (n 62) 31–6. See also Aufderheide et al (n 72).  
106  See above nn 20–9 and accompanying text. 
107  Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380, 396 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan 
JJ); Tagget v Sexton (2009) 255 ALR 522, 531 [46] (Beazley JA), quoting Cardile v LED Builders Pty 
Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 380, 405–6 [56]–[57] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ). For 
copyright, see Copyright Act s 115(2). 
108  eBay, Inc v Mercexchange LLC, 547 US 388, 391–4 (2006). 
109  Sprigman (n 38) 323–4, 340–1. 
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financial harm, then the most appropriate remedy is likely to be nominal damages 
and no injunctive relief. Such an approach is likely to cultivate, rather than hinder, 
creative activity. It offers support for transformative uses such as documentary 
films and remixes, and it provides some important breathing space for creators to 
get on with the practice of creativity, rather than being stymied by protracted 
licensing negotiations.110 
An approach to remedies that compensates only where actual harm has been 
suffered or is likely will enable creators and users to make determinations about 
their copyright practices with more confidence and care. It also more properly 
aligns not only with norms of creative practice, but with public perceptions about 
the fairness of copyright law. As one creator said to us: ‘I think the punishment far 
outweighs the crime. It’s just seen as in a really black and white perspective. That 
– you’ve broken a law, so therefore, I get to put you in court and [you give us] lots 
and lots of money. In terms of culture, there’s nothing to be gained from that’. The 
complaint here is not that creators and users should be able to do whatever they 
want with existing content. Rather, our interviewees stressed that they are always 
trying to do the right thing and to treat existing works and other creators with 
respect. They simply want to know that if they have done the wrong thing, the 
legal remedy will be proportionate to the wrong. 
 
B   Empowering Moral Rights 
The most common metaphor in copyright is that of property – the so-called 
bundle of economic rights owned and controlled by the copyright owner.111 
Copyright owners are able to exclude others from copying or using their works in 
the same way that a property owner can exclude trespassers from their land.112 Our 
studies suggest that Australian creators and consumers tend not to see copyright 
interests in this way, however. Rather, they describe copyright as a means of 
managing creative conversations and relationships, and of securing certain 
behaviours that fit with their conceptions of respectful re-use, such as proper 
attribution. 
Fortunately for Australian creators and consumers, the rights of attribution and 
integrity are enshrined in the Copyright Act as moral rights.113 Less fortunate, 
though, is that moral rights are generally treated as a separate regime from the 
more robust economic rights, and a seldom-invoked one at that. The Australian 
moral rights regime lacks teeth, reliable precedent, and comprehensive guidance 
on when the moral right of integrity, in particular, will be breached. 
 
110  See also Joseph P Liu, ‘Copyright and Breathing Space’ (2007) 30 Columbia Journal of Law & Arts 429; 
Wendy J Gordon, ‘Harmless Use: Gleaning from the Fields of Copyrighted Works’ (2009) 77(5) 
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Moral rights could be reinvigorated by drawing a stronger connection between 
the law and norms of practice around respectful re-use. It may even be possible for 
particular creator and consumer communities to work together to formalise and 
articulate what respectful re-use, proper attribution and reasonableness mean to 
them. Peter Jaszi and Patricia Aufderheide have had great success in the United 
States working with discrete communities to build consensus-based codes of best 
practice around what those communities consider to be ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ uses 
under US copyright law.114 These codes have proved instrumental in helping 
creative communities to determine and communicate when they do and do not 
expect permission to be obtained in advance for certain uses and the general 
conditions of ‘fair use’ within their community, and the codes have created enough 
sector stability that even practices around insurance have settled.115 We could 
imagine that if similar work was done with Australian creators and consumers 
around shared understandings of ‘respectful re-use’, in line with the attribution and 
integrity requirements in our moral rights provisions, then this could have a 
powerful impact on both practices and copyright case law. If copyright owners 
were asked to show harm (in line with our suggestions above) and creators and 
users were expected to demonstrate respectful re-use, then not only does the 
uncertainty around tolerated uses start to diminish, but we also start to gather more 
and better information about the actual ‘harms and benefits of different uses of 
copyrighted works’,116 which can inform how we understand and apply copyright 
law in future cases. These norms and practices can then reliably guide creators, 
consumers, copyright owners and courts, as well as the intermediary platforms on 
which many consumers engage. Greater information can help to clarify, stabilise 
and legitimise our copyright law for the digital age. 
Our thought experiment is this: instead of asking whether or not individuals 
have acquired permission in advance, what would it mean to open a conversation 
about copyright by considering whether people have attributed correctly and 
treated a work with respect? To take this seriously, courts would need to treat 
copyright as a liability rule and not a property rule.117 It also means that where uses 
are non-substitutive and the user has acted in accordance with moral rights, in most 
cases damages should only be nominal. 
 
 
114  Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi, Reclaiming Fair Use: How to Put Balance Back in Copyright 
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VII   CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have advanced a proposal that where copyright infringement 
does not cause direct economic harm to a copyright owner because the infringing 
use is non-substitutive, and where the existing work has been attributed and treated 
with integrity, the infringement should be treated as a liability rule. Courts should 
use their discretion in granting remedies to decline to grant an injunction (ie, 
decline to treat the infringement as a property rule) and, where appropriate, to grant 
only nominal damages. While this proposition may mark a shift in doctrine, it 
would mainly explicitly recognise the current dominant practical reality, where 
copyright owners only rarely enforce their rights against ordinary acts that are 
technically infringing but generally harmless. We suggest that there may be two 
big advantages of this shift. First, it would better align the law with social norms, 
an increasingly important challenge in a time when the acceptance of copyright 
principles is under great strain. Second, it would reduce the potential for inequity 
where rights-holders seek to enforce their rights not because their economic or 
moral interests are harmed, but because of personal, political, anti-competitive, or 
other reasons that are orthogonal to the protection that copyright grants
